On the Scales of Photographic Abstraction by Fisher, Andrew
 1 
On the Scales of Photographic Abstraction 
 
Andrew Fisher, Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores three key ways in which questions of abstraction have been and 
continue to be closely associated with photography: the tradition of photographs that desire to 
‘be’ abstract; the invisible but determining forms of abstraction central to capitalism and 
shaping of photography as a technical-historical form; and the technical-conceptual 
abstractions embedded in and structuring of photographic apparatuses. The exploration of 
these themes is pursued through analysis of Vilém Flusser’s philosophy of photography, 
Lambert Wiesing’s analysis of abstract photography and Allan Sekula’s critique of capitalist 
modes of equivalence and exchange as these impact on the photographic. 
These analyses are pursued through exploration of the issues, processes and operations 
of ‘scale’, ‘scaling’ and ‘scalability’ entailed in these three modes of abstraction and in their 
critical and theoretical reflection. The aim of this strategy is to outline and to analyse the 
complex web of abstractions that are central to photography and the modes of scale that are 
crucial to abstraction in this context. The article suggests that to encounter or to think about 
abstraction photographically is to operate within some modulation of scale and that this may 
in fact be the closest one can get to envisioning the complexity of abstraction in the 
photographic context. 
 
 
Photography’s modes of abstraction 
 
What are the ways in which abstraction has been and might continue to be of concern 
for photography? Two answers are familiar: on the one hand, there those photographs or 
techniques that abstract from the apparently defining tasks of photography, to figure and to 
represent things, and, on the other hand, the invisible but determining forms of abstraction 
central to capitalism and shaping of photographic appearances and uses. I would add to these 
a third, less often cited, register of abstraction in photography, namely, those largely invisible 
elements of photographic apparatuses that serve to enable both the representational or non-
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representational uses towards which they are oriented and through which the abstractions of 
capitalism find material photographic form. Vilém Flusser’s theorisation of the calculable 
conditions of the photographic articulates these conditions in terms of a concatenation of 
technical-scientific concepts, protocols and material conventions that are sedimented in 
photographic apparatuses and structuring of their ability to produce photographic images.1 
At risk of only skimming the surface of each, this article attempts to hold all three of 
these modes of abstraction in view. A suspicion orients this strategy: that the current 
understanding of abstraction’s on-going association with photography will remain limited 
unless one returns to thinking about such various registers in relation to one another. And this 
suspicion arises from existing discourse on abstraction and photography. Writing about 
‘abstract photographs’ often only seems to produce end-game rehearsals of their status as art 
and also tends towards over-extended formalisations of both abstraction and photography. 
Critical accounts of the universalised forms of social abstraction playing across the surfaces 
of images often seem challenged by change in the expansive and intensifying relations they 
question. Accounts of the calculable nature of the photographic apparatus often seem 
overwhelmed by a pessimism in which the apparatus seems fated apriori to conquer all.  
This article approaches the task of thinking about photography and abstraction through 
discussion of three examples that are helpful in avoiding the pitfalls just described. Vilém 
Flusser’s philosophy of photography has already been named as one focus. Lambert 
Wiesing’s analysis of abstract photography and Allan Sekula’s critique of capitalist modes of 
equivalence and exchange will be the basis of the following two. But before going on to 
consider them, the questions framing these discussions should be clarified. 
 
Abstraction – Photography – Scale 
 
The task of this article is to explore the issues, processes and operations of ‘scale’, 
‘scaling’ and ‘scalability’ entailed in the three modes of abstraction noted above. Two 
intuitions guide this exploration: that a complex web of abstractions is central to photography 
and that the modulation and variation of scale in photography is central to abstraction in this 
context. I suggest that to encounter or to think about abstraction photographically is to operate 
within some modulation of scale and that this may in fact be the closest one can get to 
envisioning the complexity of abstraction in the photographic context. But following through 
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on this suggestion entails an expansion in and a complication of what the term scale might 
mean.2 
The strategy is to take a step to one side to view photography through the prism of 
those senses of scale already harboured in its modes of abstraction. Attention to variations in 
the senses of scale entailed by these abstractions might enable one to delineate that which 
articulates and gives flesh to photography’s part in capitalism’s abstraction of social value, 
that grants significance to those moments at which photography eschews its normative 
representational and figural functions, and that renders the sense in which every photographic 
image is anticipated by a concatenation of abstract calculations. 
An initial transposition of the three registers of abstraction sketched above into scaled 
terms might re-describe some of their important features as follows. What one is dealing with 
is the massive ‘scale’ of the photographic as such and as its forms and processes impinge on 
lived experience, with the modes and effects of ‘scaling’ foregrounded by image-objects that 
seek to free themselves photographically from representation, and with the operations of 
‘scalability’ inscribed in the photographic apparatus as these render the world photographable. 
The term scale, in this context, thus borrows from debates about the production of space in 
political geography and critical art. It denotes phenomenological and material processes of 
encounter with photographic objects, apparatuses and the situations they structure. It refers 
one to basic photographic functions, the ways in which its sets things in temporally and 
spatially scaled relation to one another. Photography seems peculiar insofar as it appears to 
hinge on, produce and reproduce all of these modes and meanings of scale simultaneously. 
The proposal here is to project links between each of these photographic modes of 
abstraction and such issues and forms of scale, scaling and scalability. The intuitions to be 
developed are that scale is a register of abstraction in photography – perhaps that it can be 
thought of as the phenomenal form taken by abstraction in photographic terms - and that 
issues of scale are crucial to each of the modes of abstraction indicated above. Thinking of 
these in their scalar aspects might enable one to hold their intertwined character in view and 
to evaluate what this means for the relationship between abstraction and photography more 
generally. 
The background premise informing this is that, in one way or another, some process of, 
or encounter at scale - some orchestration of the different scales indicated - is always involved 
in any act, process, experience, object or machinery of photography. Risking an overly formal 
inversion, one might say that without its variously scaled characteristics and values, its 
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operations of scaling, the propensity of its objects to be scaled, de-scaled and re-scaled, its 
setting of ostensible things to scale, its inscription in spatially and temporally scaled relations 
and the ways in which these are bound within hugely scalable infrastructures, there would be 
no photography. 
So, you are being asked to entertain the notion that one or other combination of facts, 
operations and phenomena of scale is a necessary feature of all photography and that this fact 
is significant. A varying and ubiquitous operation of different senses of scale, modes of 
scaling, scaled phenomenon and conditions of scalability traverse the machinery, processes, 
uses and experiences that comprise the sprawling terrain of the photographic and, I argue, can 
be taken as a constant for photography.3  
The relationship between photography and abstraction placed in question here hinges 
on the projection of a parallel to the way in which I have previously articulated three 
significant ways in which issues of scale appear integral to photography. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
• That photographs set space and time together and to scale in the form of an 
image. 
• That, whilst photographic images tend to take fixed seeming material forms, 
these are contingent moments on a sliding scale of possible actualisations. 
• That photography not only has a substantial globalised scale but that its geo-
political import is grounded in and through the scaling operations and 
processes it operates within and serves to facilitate.4 
 
These different modes of scale meet each other, so to speak, in the photograph.5 One 
might go so far to say that qua images photographs exist in or emerge from the tension 
between these intercalated and simultaneously operative horizons of scale, scaling and 
scalability. Implications to be drawn from this are that photography’s representational 
character as a visual image form, questions of the materiality and/or immateriality of the 
photographic image and photography’s expanding and increasingly intensified roles in the 
global order of contemporary capitalism are bound up with one another in ways that invite 
conceptualisation as modes of photography’s variegated scales. And the meeting of these in 
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the photograph, I argue, registers the process of photography’s intertwined modes of 
abstraction as they take on form. 
 
Abstraction and scalability 
 
As it appears integral to the other modes of abstraction identified in the introduction, I 
will turn first to Vilém Flusser’s theorisation of photography. Flusser’s writings on 
photography offer a salutatory critical account of the forms and operations of calculation that 
he sees at work in photographic images, which set the terms for whatever photography gives 
to be seen and the experiences that photographs might elicit. What is of concern here is the 
manner in which he sees photography as being conditioned by the concatenated operation of 
technical-scientific concepts, protocols and material conventions sedimented in the 
photographic apparatus.  
For Flusser, such features anticipate photographic images and their possible uses. 
They inform the photographic apparatus, are defining of its operation and thus set the 
parameters of what might be pictured photographically: ‘The camera is programmed to 
produce photographs and every photograph is a realization of one of the possibilities 
contained within the programme of the camera’.6  
Famously, for Flusser, images are ‘significant surfaces’ that signify ‘something […] in 
space and time that they have to make comprehensible to us as abstractions’.7 The way that 
photographic images, in particular, do this is layered with further abstractions. Like other 
images, the photograph is an abstraction from the perceptual form of things. But the elements 
of a photograph bear a more highly mediated correspondence with that which they combine to 
stand for. And, crucially, this mediation presents itself in and as the photograph’s immediate 
appearance. The process of making a photographic image is one in which its programmed 
conditions make themselves invisible, but continue in this mode of invisibility to haunt what 
might be made of any representation they present to view. The immediacy of photographic 
appearances harbours these technical conditions as their defining abstraction. 
The product of an imaging apparatus, the technical image, presents a significant 
surface that Flusser distinguishes from traditional images (such as paintings) insofar as non-
technical image forms bear marks of their making out of which one is supposed to be able to 
read ‘directly’ the actions of its maker. Whether or not one finds this convincing as an 
understanding of the image forms Flusser names traditional, it does serve to project and fill 
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out what is distinctive about the technical image, which is by contrast ‘indirect’. The indirect 
form of the technical image arises from the fact that an apparatus shaped by ‘scientific texts’ 
produces it.8 This concatenation of applied theories (such as those of mechanics, computing 
and optics) can be understand in scaled terms by taking the camera as an example. 
The fact that photographs might be taken to be representations at all derives from 
variable and associated technical processes organised into an apparatus that is oriented to set 
the appearance of things in scaled relation to one another, such as through the control of focus, 
exposure and aperture. Spatial and temporal relationships between things are thus registered 
through a predetermined combination of explicit scaling functions that both offer and 
circumscribe a range of possibilities according to which orders and ratios of scale – for 
instance, relative size and position, surface area and overlap, acuity and blur – are established 
in the making of a photographic image. The resulting image tends to efface these operations 
by directing attention towards the appearance of what it might depict. It pretends, so to speak, 
to be directly interpretable whilst also harbouring hidden operations that circumscribe what 
can be imaged and how. The form and the operations in question here are explicitly scaled 
and through this scale accrues an expansive sense. 
In their scaling operation and in their scaled results photographic apparatuses produce 
what one might call a doubled visualisation of abstraction: firstly, in the sense of abstracting 
from the perceptual form of things to constitute their image and, secondly, as an expression of 
the underlying theoretical framework of the apparatus or as, in effect, the production of a 
representational image that is also a visualisation of the particular combination of invisible 
operations that enabled its making.  
One never encounters anything represented in and by photography – whether places, 
things, moments or events - other than through a combination of processes that set salient 
aspects of appearance to scale in the more or less enduring but also changeable material form 
of an image. These scaling operations not only afford the photographic image’s 
representational effects, they are also determined as conditions by the various bodies of 
technical knowledge and commercial interest governing the industries producing 
photographic apparatuses and the technologized image cultures these economic processes 
facilitate and seek to exploit. Here is a register of the third general characterisation of scale 
made in relation to photography: the operation of photography at a global scale and its 
complex and multiple scaling operations. Though it goes against the grain of Flusser’s own 
vocabulary, one can note here that the concatenation of functions that comprise the 
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apparatus’s programmed character is marked by the Marxian forms of both ‘real’ and ‘social’ 
abstraction, and the register of their overlapping relation is the meeting of these different 
scaling operations in the particular scale found by an image-object and the orienting 
possibilities structuring the array of equipment that produced it.9 
Though discussions of Flusser don’t tend to remark the fact, his theory of photography 
is inherently scaled.10 He articulates the notion of apparatus as an explicit question of scale in 
a section of the book Post History called ‘Our Shrinking’, which describes processes of 
scaling associated with the consolidation of technically articulated social relations.11 
Contrasting the gigantic and monstrous proportions of key modern apparatuses (such as the 
machine and the city and their systems of relation) with a technologically facilitated 
movement towards ‘miniaturisation’, he criticises the tendency to see, in the small-scale 
economies of relation enabled by increasingly automated and autonomously acting 
programmed technologies, an alternative to a spectre of the large-scale ‘megalomania of the 
apparatus’.12 The kinds of autonomy promised by ‘intelligent instruments’ equipped with 
‘mini-programmes’ are always already inscribed in a totality to the effect that small-scale 
possibilities are determined by the way they ‘work within and in function of gigantic 
apparatus’.13 As he writes elsewhere in the same book: ‘In such an environment we are all 
played players, Homines ludentes’.14 
The most intimate, immediate or fixed seeming experience of photography, in 
particular those arising from connections between micro and macro level processes in 
contemporary photographic apparatuses, is shot through with such scaled relations and the 
implications Flusser draws out of them. Scalability is decisive for the relational operation of 
this apparatus as it knits together affects and technical processes on the intersubjective terrain 
of contemporary photographic usage. But this can also be said of even those moments of 
photography that seem most divorced from the worldliness of representation and the social 
relations it figures.  
 
Abstract Photography 
 
The self-conscious pursuit of an ‘abstract’ photography has a long history, a core 
tendency of which takes the form of variations on a desire to turn photography to the 
production of non-representation and non-figuration.15 This highlights a defining tension in 
the idea of abstract photography that can be simply expressed. Setting out not to picture things 
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with photography, to ‘free’ it from representation, foregrounds the photographic status of its 
creations. As Gottfried Jäger has it in his essay ‘Abstract Photography’ what is projected by 
this desire is a, ‘different photography, one which does not refer to a reality outside the picture, 
as is always the case with likenesses and symbolic images. Instead, it only refers to itself.’16 
This formalist sentiment is often repeated in discussions of abstract photography and the 
function of auto-referentiality it projects is generally supposed to act as guarantee for the 
artistic status of the resulting image-object and to reveal, in an auto-poetic manner, something 
essential about photography.17 
It is against this formalist backdrop that Lambert Wiesing’s ‘What Could “Abstract 
Photography” Be?’ analyses the idea that it can only proceed by abstracting from one or more 
of the conventional functions of the photographic apparatus.18 With regard to the 
representational and figural logic of photography this entails a sliding scale of technical-
historical renunciations that bring photography to its limits: starting out with the removal of 
pictorial content, camera and lens from the photographic process and extending to the absence 
of an object interposed between light source and light sensitive surface (photograms, 
lumigrams and chemigrams are his examples here).19 For Wiesing, these variations on the 
abstract photograph concentrate attention on infrastructural elements that normally efface 
themselves when a photographic image presents something to be seen. As an image-object the 
abstract photograph foregrounds the visualisation of the absence of representation and 
figuration and thus makes emphatic the technical-material structures through which this 
absence finds manifestation. In this respect he writes:  
 
The problem of abstract photography, remarkably, is not the simple statement that it 
does not display a recognizable object, but the giving of reasons why and for what an 
abstract photo abstracts from the depiction of a familiar object. The solution to this 
problem is related to the phenomenon […] that every abstraction happens in order to 
direct attention to something that is judged to be essential. When we abstract, we 
disregard something and thereby show that we think we can disregard it. Thereby, in 
turn, we show that what we disregard, from our point of view, cannot be essential, 
since essential things can, in principle, not be disregarded. That is why every 
abstraction always leads to an exhibition of what is deemed essential; every 
abstracting turning away is linked to a visualizing turn toward.20 
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This sets up his threefold answer to the question of what abstract photography could 
be. It might forego the conventions of display ‘for the sake of image-immanent structures’, 
‘mere visibility’ or ‘object art’.21 The important difference between the abstraction from and 
display of something, here, lies in their relative directedness: ‘outwards’ towards the world of 
photographable things or ‘inwards’ to the conditions that enable this depiction but also its 
suspension. And it is this metaphor of doubled and rhythmically articulated turning that, I 
think, saves Wiesing’s analysis from the pitfalls of aesthetic formalism which otherwise 
undercut the interest of discourse on abstract photographs. Only the abstract photograph, for 
Wiesing, makes manifest that ‘we cannot create a photo that does not develop visible 
structures’ and that ‘the structures and forms that we see in abstract photography […] are the 
structures and forms that could display something but display nothing’.22 Yet, he is careful 
not to hypostatise that which might be ‘deemed essential’ in the process, to make it into a 
crudely determined essence deriving from one or other discreet aspect of photography. The 
actual linkages between what an ‘abstracting turning away’ and a ‘visualizing turn toward’ 
turn upon remains contingent and variable and the care with which Wiesing articulates this 
makes his analysis of abstract photography productive. 
But what of scale here? Starting from the second of my general observations on the 
scaled character of the photographic one might reappraise Wiesing’s account of the abstract 
photograph. The singular status of the abstract photographic art objects he defends seems to 
stand in in stark opposition to the labile and contingent infrastructural processes, which make 
these objects possible and that underpin their claim to significance.23 Their often otherwise 
interesting characteristics notwithstanding, such works tend to foreground the operation of 
combined infrastructural processes whilst hypostatising these into a static form that is 
supposed to crystallise something essential about photography. Non-pictorial visualisations of 
what is deemed essential in the process foreground surface and pattern, tonal contrast, 
apparent depth relations, blur and sharpness and the manner in which these results stand in 
relation to one another on the bounded surface of the image-object. Such features, I argue, act 
as visualisations of the broadly conceived scaling operations articulated above as these 
characterise the infrastructural operations that may be placed in question. One might say that, 
divorced of their representational function, abstract photographs do nothing but scale, show 
that they have scaled and, importantly, that they remain open to further scaling in ways that 
undercut their apparent autonomy. 
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Furthermore, what thinking about abstract photographs in formalist terms tends not to 
acknowledge is that along with the evacuation of outside reference they tend to deny the other 
modes of abstraction to which they are subject and which the refiguration of their auto-
referential – zero-degree - visualisation in scaled terms might help to reinscribe them with. 
One might think of the fact that, as image-objects, they remain open as possibilities of scaling 
in Benjaminian terms and that this would reintroduce questions of the alienation of value – of 
their abstracted commodity form - that the formalist self-description seems concerned to deny. 
In being set within circuits of reproduction, for instance, they remain as open to processes of 
de- and re-scaling as all other photographic images. Though it might seem supplementary, I 
argue that it is not actually extra to their existence as photographic works, it is integral to it 
insofar as this is a photographic possibility, much in the mode of Benjamin’s observation that 
the aura of the artwork dissolves in the face of technical reproduction.24 Abstract photographs 
attain their formalised status as art through what turns out to be a heavily ironic play on the 
very conditions that threaten this status. Viewed through the prism of scale the essentialist 
formalism associated with abstract photographs becomes an ironised marker of the sliding 
scales of possible actualisation to which all photographs are subject and this sets them within 
a horizon of determining social abstractions. By forgetting the social abstraction of value that 
contextualises them, their claim to abstraction becomes contradictory. 
Here, we can return to Wiesing’s claim that infrastructural elements of photography 
revealed by an abstraction from the functions of the apparatus are variable but necessary, 
always and operative but contingent. The significance of such elements is constitutively fluid 
and labile, not located in any particular process but in the fact that what ever form it takes 
photography is always constituted as a combination of processes that are oriented to register 
and to show something. If one were to divorce this from the formalist concern to reduce 
photography down to an absence of representation one might read Wiesing as having shown 
that such uses of photography are refinements and extensions of a generic propensity common 
to all photographic apparatuses and implied by all photographic images: that a basic function 
of photography is to register the ostensible spatial and temporal state of things, to fix these 
together at certain scales of relation and according to a combination of prefigured operations 
of scale and anticipations of scaled outcomes. Given that the operations described here are the 
locus, the meeting point of different meanings of scale in and for photography, the contingent 
modes and possibilities of ‘abstracting turning away’ and ‘visualizing turning toward’ that 
stand to reveal abstraction only multiply. The abstractions performed by abstract photography 
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thus stand out as second-order modes of abstraction resting on strategies aimed at 
disambiguating photography’s propensity for setting things to scale and the different registers 
of abstraction that already attend this. 
 
Abstraction and the Scaling of Photographic Materiality 
 
 The forms and processes of abstraction integral to capitalism impinge upon all of the 
senses of abstraction discussed above. There is, as John Roberts recently remarked: ‘ no 
photography—no photographic imaginary—that lives, or might live, on the other side of its 
effects.’25 Allan Sekula’s analyses of the forms of abstraction shaping of photography stand as 
a powerful critique of this fact. And a key focus of his work is its analysis of photography’s 
promise to act as a universal language, which, as is well known, reveals the form of such 
universality to be determined by pervasive ideologies of abstract equivalence and 
exchangeability. His essay ‘Photography Between Labour and Capital’ of 1983 articulates this 
powerfully and in a way that still resonates today.26 
Tracing the relationship between mimetic equivalence, universal exchangeability and 
calculation in the historical statements of François Arago and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sekula 
observes - firstly, with respect to Arago’s often quoted announcement of photography’s 
invention - that: 
 
Photography doubly fulfilled the Enlightenment dream of a universal language: the 
universal mimetic language of pictures yielded up a higher truth, a truth that could be 
expressed in the universal abstract language of mathematics.27  
 
And this dream of a ‘photographically mathematized nature’ quickly found economic 
expression in Oliver Wendell Holmes’s projection of a world encompassing encyclopaedic 
photographic archive in which, Sekula continues: 
 
The meaning and value of the photograph ultimately resides in its exchangeable 
character, its inclusion within this global archive which translated all sights, all 
visions, into relations of formal (and mathematical) equivalence. Holmes saw the 
photograph as the stripping of form from matter, and foresaw “a universal currency of 
these banknotes … which the sun has engraved for the great Bank of Nature.” 
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Metaphorically, he made the connection between photographic representation, 
quantification, and commodity exchange. Photography submitted the world to a 
uniform logic of representation, just as the global market established a uniform logic 
of exchange.28 
 
These connections, Sekula goes on to point out, indicate photography’s absorption 
into what Georg Simmel termed ‘the calculating character of modern times’.29 
Sekula’s analyses of particular images, discourses of photography, photographic 
practices and institutions have left us with a number of detailed and specific critiques of this 
generalised logic of abstraction and its calculative form. What this article can attempt to do, in 
coming towards its conclusion, is to offer a brief and supplementary articulation of some of 
these questions of abstraction drawing on the questions of scale discussed above. This, it is 
hoped, will be suggestive of ways of making new critical linkages between, for instance, the 
political geographies shaping of the photographic, their scaling operations and the scaled 
character of the photographic images, apparatuses and modes of experience that emerge and 
circulate within them. 
One point of purchase for such a scaling of photographic abstraction arises from the 
recent and ongoing technological transformation of photography and its persistence as a 
globally important form despite or perhaps because of these changes. At risk of over-
simplification, on the one hand, this situation only serves to intensify and make more obvious 
the fact that photographic apparatuses, images, experiences and uses are subject to the 
generalised forms of abstraction Sekula describes and that have no ‘life’ as Roberts remarks 
‘on the other side of’ the effects of abstraction. On the other hand, the massive expansion and 
intensification entailed in this processes has brought with it new forms and infrastructures 
through which such abstraction operates, which many have taken to mean that the broad 
forms and effects of capitalist abstraction familiar from Sekula’s critical project no longer 
apply and that, as a result photography has become immaterial in form.30  
Here, one can return again to the three modes of photographic scale outlined above to 
remark that the function of setting space and time together and to scale in the form of an 
image is indisociable from their actualisation as contingent moments on a sliding scale of 
possible actualisations and that these operations are grounded in and through processes 
unfolding at a global social scale. 
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All photographies necessarily find some kind of material form, however attenuated or 
dispersed, and, I argue, it is useful to think of this in terms of the ways in which they take on 
scale. This is of particular interest for attempts to understand the networked digital image and 
its apparent immateriality, often posited in contrast to the familiar material forms of earlier 
photographic convention. The networked digital image may, indeed, be defined by the fact 
that it can choose not to take on such forms. But it takes on form nonetheless in being 
distributed across different spaces, through dispersed infrastructures and experiential registers, 
the balance between which is obviously and highly changeable. Here, as Peter Osborne 
observes: ‘There is no single site of the photograph. […] There is a distributive unity to the 
photograph itself.’31 The networked digital condition of photography disperses the material 
form of the photograph, the ontological significance of which was often previously assumed 
to be located in and by one or other material substrate (such as the negative). Taking on such 
distributed form means that the photograph is no longer definable by one or other familiar 
material substrate, if it ever was. Out of this, the photograph emerges as a spatially and 
temporally extended process. But it is material insofar as it takes on scale across its different 
and changeable sites of distribution. The analysis of scale pursued above outlines it’s meaning 
as just such a process, and it too is one that can no longer be thought of as rooted in a 
particular and privileged object or relation. 
The networked digital image takes form as a variegated, compound and modally 
organised relationship of scales and it obviously does so in ways that are different from the 
pre-digital photograph. Whilst it still finds materiality at photographic scale it also rests on a 
radical innovation in photographic scale insofar as this is revealed to be mutable, variegated 
and distributive in form. Such images attain their materiality as variations on a possible 
admixture of dispersed scales with significant technical, phenomenological and global as well 
as perceptual, local and embodied registers. One might risk saying, in this context at least, 
that photographic materiality is the taking on of the admixture of the various scalar modes 
comprising of and supporting the image and its uses. And into this newly reconfigured 
admixture of photography’s scaled relations the tensions between its modes and 
understandings of abstraction are reinscribed. 
The specific mutations that mark the ‘calculating character’ of present times, and its 
photographic modulation of the abstractions exchangeability and equivalence, have produced 
newly universalised relationships between what the ‘mimetic language of pictures’ and the 
‘abstract language of mathematics’ might continue to mean. These mutations entail and have 
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foregrounded obvious and not so obvious issues of scale. And these facts suggest the need for 
a re-evaluation of the modes of abstraction common to the photographic in terms of its 
mutating modes of scale. 
 
By way of brief conclusion one can note that the three associations between 
abstraction and photography explored in this article are significantly shaped and/or oriented 
towards questions of scale. Whilst the three general observations about scale and photography 
discussed in parallel to them do not map neatly or singularly on to any one of the questions of 
abstraction considered, all three scaled aspects of the photographic do touch upon each of the 
modes of abstraction discussed and enable connections to be made between them. Thinking 
about photography and abstraction in terms of scale has complicated the meaning of the latter 
term considerably. It has also, it is hoped, suggested itself as a fruitful theoretical and critical 
figure, and a productive way of making connections between otherwise discreet levels of 
practice and forms of thinking about the photographic and its on-going association to ideas of 
abstraction.  
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